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Abstract
This paper presents a solution to the following, frequently encountered,
planning problem. A community wishes to choose a project from a variety of
alternatives. The construction of the project is undertaken by a
monopolistic firm. An intermediary (who cannot observe either technology
or preferences) is charged with the following responsibilities: (i)
evaluation of the most efficient size of each project, (ii) comparison of
the surpluses generated by the various projects at their efficient levels
and selection of a project that maximizes the surplus, (iii) evaluation of
how much each consumer pays and how much should be paid to the firm, and
(iv) decentralization in the making of distributional judgements regarding
the surplus that remains after payments have been made to the firm, i.e.
there is no social planner with an a priori welfare function; the decision
originates from the community itself. The nature of the problem is such
that it cannot be solved using existing methods of planning.
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1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with the following planning problem. A
community wishes to choose a project from a variety of alternatives. In
particular, the choice of a project means that a particular public good
will be provided to the community. The construction of the project is
undertaken by a monopolistic firm. An intermediary is found and is charged
with the following responsibilities: (i) evaluation of the most efficient
size of each project — or "internal" efficiency, (ii) comparison of the
surpluses generated by the various projects at their efficient levels and
selection of a project that maximizes the surplus — or "external"
efficiency, (iii) evaluation of how much each consumer pays and how much
should be paid to the firm, and (iv) decentralization in the making of
distributional judgements, i.e. after the firm has been paid, the choice of
a distribution scheme for the surplus that remains is made by the consumers
themselves. This is a problem which arises quite frequently. Accurate
information on both preferences and technology is generally unobservable to
a third party, especially when the demand side has a number of consumers
and the supply side is monopolistic. In addition, distributional or
welfare judgements are often suggested endogenously by the consumers
themselves and not imposed by a (usually fictitious) social planner. A
planner with a specific welfare function may not exist. The objective of
this paper is to propose a simple solution to this frequently encountered
problem.
We shall follow in the tradition of planning models that are dynamic
in nature, since they have generally achieved the greatest degree of
success in resolving incentive-compatibility problems. In this genre, the
classic is the MDP (after Malinvaud (1971, 1972) and Dreze and de la Vallee
Poussin (1971)) planning procedure. Typically, the focus of planning
problems has been on the issue of internal efficiency and not on efficiency
questions across projects. The intermediary is presumed to know the
technology of the firm providing the public good However, it does not
observe consumers' preferences. In addition, it makes its own judgements
about how the surplus is to be distributed. Within this class of problems,
the MDP procedure and its extensions have been rather successful. Under
truthful revelation of preferences and costs, the MDP procedure converges
in a monotonic and feasible manner to an individually rational and
internally efficient allocation. Malinvaud conjectured that the
convergence property would hold even if the consumers were to adopt Nash
equilibrium strategies in the reporting game at each instant in time. This
conjecture was later proved to be true by Roberts (1979) and Henry (1979)
using the local game formulation, i.e. consumers are myopic and attempt to
maximize their incremental utilities at each instant. Later results by
Champsaur and Laroque (1982) and Truchon (1984) demonstrate that under
certain modifications of the basic procedure, the Malinvaud conjecture
about convergence under Nash-manipulation holds even in a global game, i.e.
consumers maximize their final utilities.
These results, which show that the internal efficiency properties are
not destroyed when the consumers play Nash equilibrium reporting
strategies, are remarkable largely because the equilibrium reports are
generally untruthful. To resolve the question of external efficiency, we
need to measure the true social surplus generated by different projects
operated at their respective internally efficient levels. To measure such
true surpluses, truthful information is required.
Fugigaki and Sato (1981) have devised a generalization of the MDP
algorithm, for which truthful reporting on the part of the consumers is a
unique dominant strategy equilibrium in the local game. However, for this
result to hold, the consumers must receive equal shares of the surplus.
When distributional judgements are decentralized (which is the situation
that we study), such an "equal-sharing" rule will not generally be demanded
by the consumers as part of every Nash equilibrium of a game where
consumers report their willingnesses to pay and their desired distribution
schemes. An equal-sharing rule may be forced by restricting the consumers
to reports of equal-sharing schemes. This is undesirable, however, since
it would imply that an egalitarian distribution function is being imposed
on the consumers by a social planner.
To summarize, the procedures that are available do not solve our
problem. Moreover, they cannot be easily extended to do so either. This
provides the motivation for the planning procedure presented here.
The basic algorithm employed for adjusting the level of a given public
good is the MDP algorithm. The tax rules for the consumers and the
compensation paid to the firm differ from the classical recommendations.
The procedure operates in continuous-time and is given by a system of
differential equations. It induces a local game at each point in its
trajectory. We follow Roberts (1979) in modelling the agents as myopic
players. Despite its obvious limitations, this case is an important one to
study for several reasons: (i) since Nash equilibrium is generally a
solution concept for games of complete information, it is less restrictive
to assume that each player has knowledge of the marginal willingnesses to
pay and marginal costs of others at the current moment in time and does not
possess this information for the entire time-path — in this sense myopia
makes weaker informational assumptions than non-myopia; (ii) the difference
in perspective between the intermediary and the agents is more realistic;
(iii) in many developing countries the agents are not sure when the current
plains (and, perhaps, the government) will end, so they optimize as if the
current moment is the last. The case of non-myopic players is an open
question and will be dealt with in future research.
Our results have two, rather interesting, aspects. The firm is
induced to report truthfully. The consumers generally misrepresent their
marginal benefits. The aggregate of their reports, however, is equal to
the true aggregate marginal benefits. Moreover, the equilibrium
distribution scheme recommends that each consumer's share of the surplus is
equal to his/her share of the aggregate marginal benefit.
2. Preliminaries
We shall focus on a given project P, (i.e. we fix a public good) and
apply the procedure to P. Let T be the class of projects. There is a
group of agents endowed with a private good X which is available for use in
any project. We assume that utility functions are additively separable in
the private good. This provides a common numeraire good with which
surpluses from alternative projects can be measured. Having measured the
surplus generated by every P in T, we have a choice criterion.
A project P comprises a private good space for each agent i, X Q R, a
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public good space Y Q R and a set of agents, N = U,...,nh {!,..., n-1}
is a set of consumers and agent n is a firm. In the sequel, for any
variable g defined only for all I in K Q N, we shall write {g ) as g
i i i€K 6
and [g ) as g , Each i <= N is characterized by a pair (u , u )
j j€K\<0 -i i i
where u : X xY->(Risi's utility function and w € R is i's initial
i i i +
endowment of the private good with u> = 0. We assume the existence of
n
willingness-to-pay functions v : Y -> X and a cost function c: Y -> X such
i i i
that for all i € N\{n), for all x € X , for all x € X and all y € Y,
i i n n
j >
u {x
,
y) = x + v (y) and u {x , y) = x - c{y), i.e. the utility
i i i i n n n
functions are linear in the private good. For all i e N\{n), v is
i
2 2
strictly concave and C and c is strictly convex and C . In addition, for
all i € N\in}, v\ * 0, v (0) > and c' > 0, c(0) = 0. Finally, we also
assume that there exists y <= Y such that 7 v (y) < c(y). In the'
^l€N\<n> i J J
sequel, we use a (y) to denote v'(y) and /3(y) to denote c'iy) which are to
i i
be interpreted as the "true" marginal willingness to pay by i and the
"true" marginal cost to n for a level y of the public good.
A feasible allocation of resources in P is a vector z € Z = {(x, y) e
IR : Y (w - x ) = c{y)}. z € Z is internally efficient in P if there
^i€N i i ' J
exists no z' e Z such that for all i € N, u (z' ) ^ u (z ) with strict
1 i i i
inequality for some i. z € Z is individually rational if for all i € N,
U (Z ) 2: U (w , 0).
1 i 1 i
Given an allocation z which is internally efficient in P, let S(P) =
Y (u {z ) - u. (a) )) denote the surplus generated by P. P e ? isM€N i i i i f o -/
externally efficient if there exists no P' € T such that S(P') > S{P).
3. The Planning Procedure
A planning procedure is a dynamic mechanism which accepts messages
from the agents and recommends an adjustment in the allocation of resources
at each instant in time. A procedure is to be interpreted as a survey that
is performed before any construction actually takes place. Once a
procedure is applied to all the P in T and the relevant information is
collected, construction of the chosen project begins.
We shall restrict our attention here to a planning procedure which
operates in continuous-time. Let A denote the (n-2)-dimensional simplex.
At every instant t € [0, co), each consumer i sends a message m it) =
(a (t), 8 it)) € R X A and the firm n sends a message m it) = bit) € R.
i i n
Consumer i's report consists of two values: a reported marginal willingness
to pay, a it) and a surplus sharing scheme, 8 (£). The firm reports a
value for its marginal cost bit).
The following notation will be used. 5 it) denotes agent i's share of
the surplus recommended by the surplus sharing scheme 8 it). Let # (5)
denote the number of consumers who report a surplus sharing scheme 8, given
that the profile of reports is mit). Wimit)) = {8 € A: V5' € A, #m(6) *
# (<5')h An average of the elements of Wimit)) is computed. 5 it) =
w
^
. Observe that 5 (£) € A.5€W(m(t)) w
\Wimit))\
The planning procedure introduced in this paper is a system of
differential equations [1] - [3]. We shall ignore the case y = and use
an overdot to represent the time derivative.
Vt € [0, oo), given an initial position (*:(0), y(0)):
y {t) ^ ^Nx<n>a i (t) - bit) [1]
Vi
€ N\{n>,
xit) = - 8 l it)l , ait)yit) + -8
l
it)[yit)V
i w ^j€N\<n} j J 2 w J [2]
x it) = bit)yit) + -Cyit)]
2
[3]
n 2
The level of the public good is adjusted using the classical MDP
method. Consumers are taxed in the following way: at each instant in time
the surplus sharing scheme that gets the maximum number of recommendations
is chosen. If there is no unique "winner", then an average is computed
from all the joint winners. This is 5 it). The i-th consumer is asked to
w
pay the proportion 8 it) of the aggregate of the reported marginal
willingnesses to pay. The rate of accumulation of the surplus is given by
the expression [y(t)l . The surplus is split in half. One half goes to
the firm. The i-th consumer's share of the remaining half of the surplus
is S
l
U).
w
A stationary point of the system [l]-[3] is an allocation ixit), yit))
such that yit) = 0. The first result shows that under truthful revelation
of the relevant information about the firm and about the consumers as a
whole, the procedure given above converges to an individually rational and
internally efficient allocation. Thus, it shares the convergence
properties of other procedures discussed in the literature. We shall write
a (yit)) and fiiyit)) as a it) and (Bit) respectively.
i i
Theorem 1: The planning procedure specified by the system [l]-[3]
converges to an allocation z € Z satisfying individual rationality and
internal efficiency if for all t <= [0, ooj, (i) V ait) =y
^i€N\<n> i
Il€NN{n>
a a;, and (ii) b(t) = (3(t)-
Proof: By our assumptions, x and y and Vit) = £ uixit), yit)) are
• • •
bounded above. By definition, Vit) £ 0. Also, Vit) = implies that yit)
= for all t e [0, oo). Thus, the system [l]-[3] admits a Lyapunov
function, V and, by Lyapunov' s second method, converges to a stationary
point. At a stationary point, the familiar Lindahl-Samuelson condition for
Pareto-efficiency, i.e. internal efficiency, is met. Since utility of each
agent is monotone and non-decreasing throughout the process, a stationary
point is also individually rational.
The key assumptions in the theorem above are (i) and (ii). Given that
S
(a ). and /3 are unobservable to the operator of the procedure, and given
that the distributional parameters are determined in a decentralized
manner, these assumptions are non-trivial. Hence, it is natural to treat
the procedure as a non-cooperative game. The strategy of each agent i in N
at t is m (t). Thus, the strategy space is given by R
n
x A
n
~ and the
payoffs at each t € [0, oo) are the instantaneous increments in the agents'
utilities and are given by:
Vm(t) = ((a(t), Sit)), bit)),
Vi € N\{n},
1 «.!
u(m(t)) = [a(t) - S (t)Y a(t)]y(t) + -5 (£)[y(t)] [4a
i i w ^j€N\<n) J 2 w
u (m(t)) = [bit) - /3(t)]y(t) + -[y(t))
2
[4b]
n 2
The payoff to each agent has two components — the first one is the
gain due to the simultaneous manipulation of private information and the
second is the agent's share of the surplus. At every t € [0, »), the list
{N, R x A , u} defines a local game T(t). For all t € [0, oo), a Nash
equilibrium of Tit) is a list m(t) such that for all i € N, for all im'it),
i
m^it))
€
R
n
X A
n_1
, u((m*(t), m_(t)) * Limit)).
Armed with these definitions, we are ready to prove the main result of
the paper. If all agents play their components of a Nash equilibrium
strategy at every t, then the relevant information needed to meet the
conditions of Theorem 1 is transmitted by the agents. The satisfaction of
these conditions ensure that the true values T a (£) and £(£) are
^i€N\(n> i
made available to the intermediary for all t € [0, oo). This provides a
centralized availability of the accurate information about the project P
that is required for computing the true social surplus generated by P,
S{P). Once the procedure is applied to all P in T, the intermediary can
select one that generates the maximum surplus. Thus, external efficiency
is ensured. To prove our result, we need at least three consumers.
Theorem 2: Assume n £ 3. At each t € [0, m), for any Nash equilibrium
((a(t), 8(t)), b(t)) of the local game induced by the planning procedure
defined by [l]-[3], we have (i) Y
,
a(t) - T , a (t), (ii) b(t) =
i€N\(n> i i€N\(n> i
fi(t). Moreover, the local game induced by the planning procedure defined
by [l]-[3] has a non-empty set of Nash equilibria at each t € [0, m).
Proof: Choose t e [0, oo). Let m (t) = ((a (t), 5 (t)), b (t)) denote a
Nash equilibrium for the the local game Hi). We shall show that the
«
properties (i) and (ii) are satisfied by m it) and then show that such an
equilibrium indeed exists.
*
First, we shall show that b (t) = /3(t). The payoff to agent n when
all agents in N\{n} play their Nash equilibrium strategy is
#
u (m (t), m (t)) =
n -n n
[bit) - pltmi
,
a it) - bit)} +
-[l , a (t) - bit))
2
[5]
^i€N\<n> i 2 ^i€N\<n) i
Maximizing [5] with respect to bit) yields
Y a it) - 2b(t) + /3(t) - V a (t) + bit) = 0.
M<EN\<n> i ^i€N\<n> i
which reduces to
bit) = (Bit)
By definition of Nash equilibrium,
b*(t) = (Bit). [6]
The next step in the proof involves the agents in N\{n). Given that
the other agents are playing their Nash equilibrium strategies, the payoff
to each i € N\{n} is
3d
u Urn (t), m it)) =
i i -i
10
^ J, J, it
[a(t) - 5
1
(«£,__, . a.(t) - 8
l
(t)a.(t)][V a.tt) +
i w *^j€N\<n,i> j w i ^j€N\<n,i> j
ait) - b*it)] + V*(t)[]T
,w .«*(« + a.tt) - b*(t)]
2
[7]
i 2 w j€N\<n,i> j l
Maximizing [7] with respect to a tt), yields
<x(t) - 8
l
*(t)Y,
,
a* it) - 8
l
*it)ait) = 0. [8]
i w ^j€N\(n,i> j w i
*
By definition of a Nash equilibrium, a tt) = a.tt) in [8]. Thus, we
i*
get
0L.it) = s
1 («r. a tt)
i w ^IceNMn) k
For each k € N\{n), we can derive the equation [9]. Summing the
corresponding equations [9] over all k e N\{n), we get
Y a tt) = y a*(t) [10]
^i€N\<n> i ^IceNMn) k
By [6] and [10], the conditions for Theorem 1 are fulfilled in a Nash
equilibrium. To check that a Nash equilibrium exists at every t € [0, oo)
choose mtt) = iia(t), 8(t)), b(t)) such that a tt) = a it) for all i €
N\{n) and for all i, k € WMn}, 5*(t) = a (t)/Y ot it) and b(t) =
k 1 ^j€N\<n> j
pit). By construction, no consumer can unilaterally affect 8 it) since n ^
w
3. Given 8 it) ^ and the assumptions on u for all k <= JV, (a(t), Stt),
w k
btt)) is a Nash equilibrium since the conditions [6], [9] and [10] obtained
above are met.
4. Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to address a specific problem in
planning for which no resolution had been suggested by the existing
literature on the subject. A particular mechanism was devised. This
mechanism exploits the fact that efficiency in allocation problems with
public goods requires accurate information about marginal willingnesses to
pay at the aggregate level. The set of equilibria of the mechanism
11
contains a continuum of equilibria.
In addition, the distribution scheme that emerges in an equilibrium
has a specific form given by the conjunction of equations [9] and [10].
Thus, endogenizing the decisions regarding distributive justice has
affected the neutrality of the mechanism that we use. A notion of
distributive justice that offers "refunds" to consumers in proportion to
their relative marginal willingnesses to pay for a project (this is the
implication of [9] and [10]) may be theoretically justifiable by appealing
to the sort of mechanism presented here.
We conclude with the observation that a broader question that this
paper raises is: how are the results on mechanism design affected when
notions of social welfare emanate from the agents themselves? It is
typical to assume that social welfare correspondences and performance
standards are arbitrarily pre-determined. Realism demands that the choice
of such be part of every agent's strategy space. Can any given notion of
social welfare be justified as an equilibrium outcome of some mechanism
that takes account of this endogeneity? In a rather limited context, this
paper has attempted to address this question.
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